#Palladium of the People: A Kantian Right to Internet Access by Buckman, Christopher
 1 
#Palladium of the People: A Kantian Right to Internet Access 
Christopher Buckman 
ccb0040@auburn.edu 
Publication information: Sociologia: Rivista Quadrimestrale di Scienze Storiche e Sociali Anno 




Lack of high-speed internet access remains a problem in the United States, particularly in rural 
areas, Tribal lands, and the U.S. territories. High-speed internet should be considered a basic 
right because it connects people to social media, the new public sphere. Critics worry about the 
politically polarizing effects of online social media, but its ability to unify, connect, and shape 
policy decisions should also be taken into account. Engaging with Jürgen Habermas’s early work 
on the public sphere, I argue that the technical and cultural extension of access to social media 
can realize Kant’s vision of the public sphere as a bridge between morality and politics. 
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     It is not difficult to argue for a right to internet access. A necessity of twenty-first century life, 
the web connects us to news, employment, email, and art. Inability to utilize these vital resources 
frustrates personal and professional development; hence a right grounded in access to basic tools 
needed to protect autonomy and advance the individual’s ability to make substantive life-
choices. Likewise, the widely recognized value of a healthy and vibrant democratic community 
demands an educated citizenry. From the point of view of both the individual and the collective, 
it seems clear that establishing universal, high-speed broadband is ethically imperative.1 
                                                        
1 Despite advances in digital infrastructure, the “digital divide” remains an obstacle in the United 
States. According to the Federal Communication Commission’s Broadband Progress Report, 34 
Million Americans lacked access at a threshold minimum speed (25 Mbps download/ 3 Mbps 
upload) in 2016. The problem was especially acute in rural areas (39 percent lacked high-speed 
access), Tribal lands (41 percent) and the U.S. Territories of American Samoa, Guam, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (66 percent total, including 
98 percent of those living in rural areas, the last group alone amounting to over one million 
individuals). Add to these numbers the many times more who do not subscribe where access is 
available, often due to financial constraints or inadequate education in new technology. For 
results of the 2016 Broadband Progress Report, see https://www.fcc.gov/reports-
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 I would like to argue for the same conclusion, but from, perhaps, less obvious premises: 
access to the internet should be considered a basic right because social media constitutes a public 
sphere bridging morality and politics. While likening the web to the older forms of the public 
sphere is not a new idea, it has fallen out of favor in recent years. Twitter, Facebook, and 
Instagram are typically viewed as polarizing forces, entrenching us in our prejudices, trapping us 
in confirmation bubbles, and inundating us with “fake news.” The public’s unsavory fixation on 
celebrity culture blends calamitously with politics, culminating in the authoritarian spectacle of 
@realDonaldTrump and kadyrov_95 (the popular Instagram account of Chechen strongman 
Ramzan Kadyrov). The consensus seems to have shifted toward the judgment formulated in 
Wired after Trump’s election: “The internet did a better job of fostering cross-community 
conversation eight years ago when Obama was first elected,” because “our digital social 
existence has turned into a huge echo chamber.”2 In New York Times columnist Roger Cohen’s 
vision of a dystopian near-future, “the internet and hyperconnectivity had turbocharged the deep-
seated human craving for authority while empowering those who knew least to shout loudest.”3 
 Even Jürgen Habermas has voiced a largely negative opinion of social media, contrasting 
the internet unflatteringly with the nineteenth century public sphere. The latter focused attention 
on a few crucial political questions. The web, in contrast, “distracts and dispels,” fracturing 
                                                        
research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/2016-broadband-progress-report. Accessed June 28, 
2017. 
2 Mustafa M. El-Bermawy, “Your Filter Bubble is Destroying Democracy.” Wired. 11/18/16. 
https://www.wired.com/2016/11/filter-bubble-destroying-democracy/. Accessed April 20, 2017. 
3 Roger Cohen, “Life, Liberty and Ivanka.” The New York Times. 4/21/2017. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/opinion/life-liberty-and-ivanka.html. Accessed April 21, 
2017. 
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attention and diffusing political consciousness.4  While noting social media’s potential to 
democratize public discourse, Habermas worries that “the rise of millions of fragmented 
discussions across the world tends instead to lead to fragmentation of audiences into isolated 
publics.”5 
Fragmentation, polarization, dispersal. Are these truly the effects of social media on 
political discourse? I shall argue that the undeniable phenomenon of online political polarization 
conceals a deeper unifying power. Habermas’s own early account of modern public discourse, 
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, identifies the instability in the early modern public sphere in Kant’s overt claim that only 
property owners—free to serve the state—can legitimately participate.6 Hegel and Marx were 
therefore correct in unmasking the public sphere’s pretense to universal, rational morality as 
ideology. Today’s social media has no such restriction in its self-awareness, although in practice 
many groups are excluded. What is now required to make good on the claim to moral dialogue is 
a material extension of access, both technologically and culturally. Increased inclusivity, made 
possible by the recognition of a universal right to internet access, would allow social media to 
fulfill its potential as a Kantian bridge between the moral and political. In what follows, I shall 
explain how Habermas’s interpretation of Kant’s version of the public sphere clarifies the role of 
                                                        
4 Jürgen Habermas interviewed by Markus Schwering. “Internet and Public Sphere: What the 
Web Can’t do.” Reset DOC. 7/24/2014. http://www.resetdoc.org/story/00000022437. Accessed 
April 20, 2017. 
5 Quoted by Stuart Jeffries, “A Rare Interview with Jürgen Habermas.” FT Magazine. 4/30/2010. 
https://www.ft.com/content/eda3bcd8-5327-11df-813e-00144feab49a. Accessed April 20, 2017. 
6 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. Tr. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1989. 
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social media, borrowing from Kant’s political theory to suggest that the internet’s potential to 
bridge morality and politics is enough to establish a right to broadband.  
 
Habermas’s central thesis in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere is that a reading 
and debating public influenced modern government so as to constitute a limiting power on 
centralized authority. This version of civil society eroded with the replacement of the classical 
bourgeois social order by a welfare state integrated with a mass media apparatus.  
Scholars have questioned the accuracy of his description of public opinion as a singular 
phenomenon. Nancy Fraser, for instance, claims that Habermas “idealizes” the official bourgeois 
public by understating its exclusions, especially in regard to gender, as a result of his failure to 
recognize competing public spheres composed of marginalized social groups.7 A plurality of 
public spheres existed from the start. Similarly, historian David Zaret argues that Habermas’s 
neglect of the technological role of printing in the formation of the early public sphere leads him 
to misconceive public opinion as a solely bourgeois phenomenon, when in fact participation was 
historically earlier and socially diverse.8 Both critiques question the factual restriction of early 
modern public debate to a single social class. 
 While such revisions of the historical account of the development of the public sphere are 
both credible and relevant to its current online iteration, I am more concerned here with the self-
understanding of public rationality charted by Habermas in sections 13 and 14 of The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere. These sections, comparatively neglected in the secondary 
                                                        
7 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy.” Social Text, No. 25/26 (1990), p. 61. 
8 David Zaret, Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in 
Early-Modern England. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2000. 
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literature, are essential for understanding the political function of the public sphere in connection 
with moral philosophy.  
 Despite the German term öffentliche Meinung not entering common usage until nearly 
1800, Habermas holds that Kant’s political philosophy represents the most fully developed self-
awareness of the bourgeois public sphere.9 Kant’s principle of rationality in the ideal order, 
domestic and international, prohibits rule by autocratic will; only through practical reasoning can 
the constraint on liberty essential to state power be justified—a process guaranteed by actual 
debate transpiring between educated and informed citizens. Scholars initiate a conversation 
among the qualified public, a discussion serving to provide an enlightened and willing sovereign 
with knowledge to act and license to rule. Public argumentation unfolds in a condition of 
freedom, satisfying, as Kant identifies it, humanity’s “natural vocation” to societal 
communication.10 A politics of publicly justified moral norms replaces a Hobbesian politics of 
brute domination.  
 A paradox hides here. Because the transition to legitimation by public opinion must rest 
not simply on the gradual evolution of civil society but “collective oneness of the combined 
will,” the original constitution of a publicly regulated rule by moral standards would seem to 
require an initial coercive act, one that contradicts the norms of the intended rational order.11 Civil 
society desires and deserves power while eschewing the means to gain it. Kant escapes the 
problem through the employment of a teleological account of historical development. As 
outlined in the first supplement to his Perpetual Peace essay, the mechanical force of our strictly 
self-interested nature suffices to bring humankind into a situation consistent with, if not rooted 
                                                        
9 Habermas 1989, p. 102. 
10 Quoted ibid., p. 107. 
11 Ibid., p. 108. 
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in, morality because commercial interests demand concord and prosperity, circumstances only 
possible with mutual cooperation and the cessation of violent conflict.12 Once this stage of social 
development has been achieved, only a small step brings us to morally legitimate civil authority. 
 This thought (in truth a rhetorical gambit) leads Kant to restrict access to the public 
sphere to those with a direct interest in commerce: the owners of remunerative property. As 
Habermas points out, Kant’s hesitant sociological categories capture nicely the distinction 
between traders in commodities and wage laborers.13 Only through the exclusion of economically 
unfree persons can Kant posit the coincidence of materially motivated self-interest and spiritually 
free moral agency. But—and this is the fatal contradiction in Kant’s model—this maneuver 
makes the moral legitimacy of the public sphere’s authority over the political depend on its 
historically contingent class composition, the “classic relationship of bourgeois-homme-
citoyen.”14 It begins to look like the ideology of the bridge between morality and politics conceals 
the true purpose of civil society: the advancement of commercial interests. In Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right, therefore, we find public opinion’s influence over governance checked by a civil power 
authorized to assert the interests of the whole against economic factions wearing a mask of 
universality.15 
 Even granting Habermas’s critics’ claim that the professional and business classes had no 
lock on public opinion, they did command the portion of public debate admitted as an influence 
on civil society, and ultimately the ear of the sovereign. From this critical function social classes 
deemed servile were expressly excluded. While printing technology permitted greater 
                                                        
12 Immanuel Kant, “Toward Perpetual Peace.” Practical Philosophy. Ed. Mary J. Gregor. New 
York: Cambridge UP, 1996. 
13 Habermas 1989, p. 110. 
14 Ibid. p. 116. 
15 Ibid. 120. 
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participation in public debate than hitherto possible, it was unable to bring about interpenetration 
of mutually exclusive spheres. The bridge between morality and politics remained unbuilt 
because the official exchange of ideas passed off economic interest as public morality, a ruse 
enabled by the nature of the medium of communication. 
  The internet differs profoundly in this respect. The temporal and spatial condensation it 
effects fundamentally destabilizes established communicative hierarchies. The nature of print 
allows the restriction of participation, generating distinct publics. The nature of the internet 
supports transparency and connectivity, characteristics only canceled out with great effort, and, 
as recent hacking and leaking scandals show, even then without complete success. Social media 
platforms in particular tend to evolve in the direction of broader inclusivity, a process illustrated 
by Facebook’s growth from a local platform for Harvard students to a global public forum. This 
tendency is strengthened by the reverse not usually being possible: a shrinking online social 
network is headed for extinction or irrelevance. The logic of social media works to weave digital 
publics ever closer together. Just as important, the self-understanding of social media omits 
restrictions based on class or status. 
 The claim I am making—that social media unifies the public sphere—would seem to be 
at variance with the undeniable polarization of American political life transpiring online and in 
physical reality. Consider, for example, Pizzagate. Conspiracy theorists collaborated on Reddit 
and similar sites to detail an elaborately, if irregularly, substantiated narrative alleging the 
involvement of Hillary Clinton, advisor John Podesta, and other top Democrats in a child-sex 
ring operating in part out of the basement of a Washington, D.C. pizza parlor. Evidence included 
hints of homosexuality, a purportedly decadent connection to global culture elites including 
performance artist Marina Abramović, and similarities between local business logos and 
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clandestine pedophilia symbols. The theory gained currency over Facebook and YouTube. A 
North Carolina man was far from alone in taking the accusations seriously when he arrived to 
inspect the restaurant, acknowledging the falsity of the claims only after discharging an assault 
rifle in the course of his investigation. But the conspiracy theory would not die: over four months 
later, in March 2017, protesters in front of the White House demanded the government take steps 
against Clinton and her Pizzagate cult. Placards bore twitter-ready slogans such as #SAVE THE 
CHILDREN.16 
 The worst fears about social media’s impact on society seem here to intersect: the 
elevation of partisanship above citizenship, the total immersion of the online subject in biased 
content, and even a rejection of truth as a regulative goal of discourse. Not only does social 
media fail to advance real dialogue, it entrenches political factions and inhibits conversation 
between them. It appears that the broad use of social media produces disunity. I shall offer, 
however, two reasons to think this view is false, one theoretical and the other empirical. 
 First, that conflict between factions is incited online does not imply that there is less 
moral and political unity than there was previously. In a situation of relative isolation, disunity 
exists without direct conflict. What we are seeing may well be explained by a higher level of 
engagement. While the danger exists of individuals reaffirming and consolidating their polarized 
positions as a reaction to inimical experiences with political opponents, it is just as likely that the 
factions will, over the long run, find harmony that was lacking when there was no contact 
between the groups. Colliding as antagonists allows us to, in Shaftesbury’s phrase, “polish one 
                                                        
16 Michael E. Miler, “Protesters Outside White House Demand ‘Pizzagate’ Investigation.” The 
Washington Post. 25 March 2017. Web. Accessed April 27, 2017. 
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another and rub off our corners.”17 The Pizzagate affair, for instance, has potential to spark 
discussion about norms of epistemic justification. That some individuals act rashly on 
unsubstantiated claims is not a new phenomenon caused by the internet. Social media does, 
however, make such behavior more visible, leading to the appearance of a causal relation where 
none exists. The visibility of irrational behavior may in truth act to regulate it, extending norms 
of critical thinking. We are still in the early stages of social networking. Any flare-up of 
hostilities should be understood as a temporary phenomenon concealing a more profound and 
lasting concord. 
 Second, and supporting this interpretation, empirical evidence indicates that current 
political polarization is caused not by social media but unrelated factors. Researchers with the 
National Bureau of Economic Research applied established measures of political polarization to 
various demographic groups in the United States. If the internet were a primary cause of 
polarization, one would expect the demographic groups most engaged with the internet to be the 
most polarized. The opposite turned out to be true. Polarization has increased more among 
people over the age of 75 than the 18 to 39 year-olds likely to be online. As the authors conclude, 
“[these] findings are difficult to square with a straightforward account linking the recent rise of 
polarization to the internet. This is especially true for accounts in which social media plays a 
central role.”18 Whatever has led to the fraught state of political affairs in America, one must 
                                                        
17 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury. “Sensus Communis, an Essay on the 
Freedom of Wit and Humor.” Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times. Ed. Lawrence 
E. Klein. New York: Cambridge UP, 1999. 
18 Levi Boxell et al. “Is the Internet Causing Political Polarization? Evidence from 
Demographics.” NBER Working Paper 23258. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 




conclude that social media is not a primary cause. In fact, the lower rate of polarization among 
groups who interface with each other through the internet is consistent with the claim that social 
media works against disunity. 
 A controversial illustration of social media’s impact on public debate is the Black Lives 
Matter movement, which has used online communication to raise public awareness of police 
killings of black Americans. Internet activist Alicia Garza introduced the phrase “Black Lives 
Matter” in response to the acquittal of George Zimmerman for the killing of unarmed black teen 
Trayvon Martin.19 The exposure surrounding the 2014 protests in Ferguson, Missouri solidified it 
in the national consciousness.  
Critics view the campaign as a slide toward the fragmentation of public life, pitting a 
racial minority against law enforcement and its supporters. Whether the complaints of police 
brutality are just or not, the thinking goes, it is unfortunate that public debate is taken over by 
antagonism and seemingly irresolvable opposition. 
 It is true that the format of much social media—Twitter especially, with its 140-character 
limit—reveals a weakness in this connection. Slogans and sound bites transmit better than well-
reasoned argumentation. The reception of Black Lives Matter has consequently tended to reduce 
critical race theory to a limited aspect of the problem through narrow focus on police shootings, 
provoking an understandable response from harried police officers who feel they have been 
assigned far too much blame for an issue rooted deep in American history.  
All things considered, however, the effort has been a success in its impact on the public 
understanding of race in America. On the most basic level, the term itself prompted thought on 
                                                        
19 Natalie Baptiste, “Origins of a Movement.” The Nation. February 27, 2017. 
https://www.thenation.com/article/origins-of-a-movement/. Accesses April 29, 2017. 
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the discrepancy in treatment between black and white citizens in their direct encounters with law 
enforcement. For those willing to dig deeper, long-form pieces proliferated online explaining the 
context of the movement.20 It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Black Lives Matter 
in bringing wider attention, in part through news coverage, to a new generation of writers on race 
and society. The significance of the awards bestowed on Ta-Nehisi Coates, Colson Whitehead, 
and Paul Beatty, along with the continuing relevance of Michelle Alexander’s scholarly work on 
the penal system, can only be understood in the context of the popular elucidation of race 
relations conditioned by #BlackLivesMatter. All of this has gone toward determining a new 
range of opinion in the consensus understanding of racism in America, demonstrating social 
media’s power to effect the renegotiation of moral norms. 
It has also had an impact on state power, spurring reforms in policing. In one typical case, 
the Justice Department under Obama extended an ongoing investigation of police techniques in 
Baltimore after the 2015 death of Freddie Gray while in police custody. The incident was widely 
discussed due to attention from Black Lives Matter activists. The city agreed to submit to federal 
oversight in matters of discriminatory police practices, an arrangement upheld by the judicial 
branch in 2017 despite coming under attack by the Trump administration.21 Recent years have 
also seen the adoption of body cameras in many police departments. These include New York 
City, as mandated by federal order.22 
                                                        
20 For examples, see Emily Perper, “Black Lives Matter: A Reading List.” Longreads. 
https://longreads.com/2016/07/11/black-lives-matter-a-reading-list/. Accessed April 29, 2017. 
21 Pema Levy, “A Federal Judge Just Ignored Jeff Sessions and Approved Baltimore’s Police 
Reforms.” Mother Jones. April 7, 2017. http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/04/jeff-
sessions-couldnt-stop-consent-decree-baltimore. Accessed April 29, 2017. 
22 Ashley Southall, “New York’s First Police Body Cameras Take to Streets in Upper 
Manhattan.” New York Times. April 27, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2017. 
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Black Lives Matter, then, demonstrates how social media can constitute the link between 
morality and politics envisioned by Kant as the proper function of the public sphere: by forming 
public opinion about racial oppression, the movement helps set moral parameters within which 
government policy is shaped. That there is dissent from that public opinion does not undermine 
the model; in Kant’s version of the public sphere, moral understanding is advanced through 
argument and debate. Social media marks a real achievement in unifying the public sphere 
precisely because it allows that debate to happen in a broader and more interconnected forum 
than previously possible, affording admission to anyone with internet access. This means that the 
essential inadequacy of the early-modern public sphere documented by Habermas—its express 
limitation to the propertied classes, at least insofar as it helped constitute the legitimate power of 
civil society—has finally been surpassed, at least in potential. All that remains is to solve the 
technical problem of securing high-speed access universally. 
Social media’s ability to bridge morality and politics is reason enough to insist on a right 
to broadband. As Kant taught, a healthy public sphere promises a twofold benefit: it advances 
enlightenment and it protects from tyranny. Kant describes the former function in the essay What 
is Enlightenment, in which he maintains that robbing the people of the capacity to publicly 
debate social and religious issues “is to violate the sacred right of humanity and trample it 
underfoot.”23 This is not mere rhetoric. If we accept an ethics valuing autonomy and freedom, it is 
incumbent on us to promote critical thought and argument-sharpened freedom of opinion. We 
must at the same time support a discursive environment in which such debate is normatively 
regulated and rationally substantiated. Since social media unifies the public sphere while giving 
                                                        
23 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” Practical Philosophy. 
Ed. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge UP, 1996. P. 20 (Academy Edition 8:39). 
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individuals a platform for self-expression, the right to enlightenment translates in our historical 
moment into a right to access the internet. This is true even if we don’t always agree with the 
outcome of public debate. 
 As long as the online public sphere flourishes, we will be safeguarded against many of 
the worst effects of any negative outcomes. Authoritarianism can only take root when civil 
society is closed off from public comment on government activity. A glance at Twitter will show 
that citizens continue to criticize the state freely. We might update Kant’s saying about the 
freedom of the pen and hold that the freedom to tweet is “the sole palladium of the people’s 
rights.”24 This freedom consists not only in the absence of restrictions on online expression, but 
also in the extension of the technical and cultural conditions affording every person access to 
social media, the new public sphere. 
                                                        
24 Immanuel Kant, “On the Common saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but it is of No Use 
in Practice.” Practical Philosophy. Ed. Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge UP, 1996. P. 302 
(8:304). 
